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JUDGE-MADE INSURANCE THAT WAS NOT
ON THE MENU: SCHMIDT v. SMITH AND
THE CONFLUENCE OF TEXT,
EXPECTATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE REALM OF EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES LIABILITY
JEFFREY

W.

STEMPEL*

INTRODUCTION

In Schmidt v. Smith,! the New Jersey Supreme Court caught
more than a few observers by surprise. 2 New Jersey courts have
generally issued opinions regarded as pro-claimant and pro-policy
holders. 3 But everyone's taste for recompense and coverage has

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. This commentary is in part an outgrowth of a presentation on "Emerging Cov
erage Issues" delivered at the Professional Liability Underwriters Symposium, EPLI
and the Changing Workplace (Mar. 2, 1999 in New York) and other writings on employ
ment claims. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES Ch.
21 (2d ed. 1999); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, Recent Case Developments, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
489 (1998). Special thanks to Jeff Klenk, Jay Mootz, and other Symposium participants,
Mara Levy for research assistance, as well as to Ann McGinley, Ken Vinson, and Dean
Dick Morgan.
1. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
2. See, e.g., David F. McGonigle, Recent Developments: Employment Discrimina
tion/Harassment Claims Under EL Policies: Schmidt v. Smith, J. INS. COVERAGE, vol. 1,
no. 1, at 94 (1998) (discussing the case without overt criticism but clearly treating the
decision as important and suggesting it represents a new and unexpected development
for insurance coverage law); Susanne Sclafane, N.J. Harassment Ruling Roils WC Mar
ket, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS. RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Apr. 5, 1999, at 16
(noting that after the decision there was an "initial outcry by insurers" that it "would
send workers' compensation premiums soaring" and treating the decision as surprising
and a major fissure in the structure of insurance coverage packages typically offered for
commercial risks, but quoting industry sources that the impact of the decision may be
slower and less drastic than first envisioned by insurers); Daniel Hays, N.J. WC Rocked
by Sex Ruling, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PRoP. & CAS. RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., June 29,
1998, at 4 (same); Comp Policy Covers Harassment Defense, Bus. INS., July 13, 1998, at
10 (treating the ruling as surprising and threatening to existing combination of workers'
compensation and employers' liability claims).
3. See, e.g., Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831
(N.J. 1993) (finding that, linguistically, the qualified pollution exclusion bars coverage
for pollution claims against policyholder, but that representations of insurers to regula
tors made in connection with approval of the exclusion require insurer to provide cov
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limits.
In Schmidt, the court exceeded those limits for many observers
by holding that despite what it regarded as clear contract language
in an exclusion, an insurer providing Employers' Liability ("EL")
coverage along with Workers' Compensation ("WC") insurance for
the employer was required to provide coverage in a case of blatant
sexual harassment bordering on criminal assault. In doing so, the
Schmidt court, however laudable its motives, pushed doctrines of
reasonable expectations of coverage, public policy, and statutory in
terpretation further than was necessary or wise.
Although the net result of the decision may be salutary to the
degree it provides greater recompense for victims of sexual harass
ment and other discriminatory injury in the workplace, Schmidt v.
Smith remains a troubling episode of judicial enthusiasm for man
dated coverage. 4 Although the workers' compensation realm of
law imposes more coverage responsibilities upon employers and in
surers, the nature of the underlying claim and the clarity of the ex
clusion should have received greater attention by the court.
Notwithstanding the statutory framework of the workers' compen
sation law, the Schmidt v. Smith decision was not as compelled as
the court suggests. Certainly, traditional means of contract and
statutory construction do not support mandating coverage and it is
erage so long as discharge of contaminant was not intentional, even if release of
pollutant was gradual rather than abrupt); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins.
Co., 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (adopting a subjective approach to intentional injury
defense; setting forth principles of apportionment of insurer and policyholder responsi
bility for covered and uncovered claims); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d
1255 (N.J. 1992) (holding that emotional injury constitutes "bodily injury" under insur
ance policy, so long as accompanied by some physical manifestation); Sparks v. St. Paul
Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the claims-made policy was not uncon
scionable as a genre of insurance product, but imposing certain requirements for use of
form); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979) (finding that there was
no coverage under liability policy for a claim of customer dissatisfaction over subpar
quality of construction work); Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969) (apply
ing reasonable expectations approach to hold that homeowner's coverage for flooding
of home office was not barred by business pursuits exclusion); Kievit v. Loyal Protec
tive Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961) (applying reasonable expectations approach
to find coverage despite exclusion).
4. The term is Professor Kenneth Abraham'S, taken from his article, Judge-Made
Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations o/the Insured,
67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1162-63 (1981), from which the term "judge-made insurance" is
also borrowed. Professor Abraham used both terms to refer to a category of insurance
coverage decisions where despite little textual guidance-or even clear contrary lan
guage-courts found coverage for policyholders out of a belief that the insurance policy
in question should provide such coverage in light of the nature of the policy and the
context of the claim.
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by no means clear that mandated coverage is the public policy "an
swer" to the dilemma faced by the Schmidt court. S
In addition, the court's approach on behalf of policyholders
and claimants borrows from the suspect jurisprudential approach of
reading policy language with great literalism and making sweeping
pronouncements regarding wrongdoing and public values. 6 In re
cent years, insurers have often been the litigants advocating this ex
treme form of contract or statutory construction. Take perhaps the
most extreme recent example: general liability insurers have fre
quently (and with more success than they deserve) invoked the lin
guistic breadth of the "absolute pollution exclusion" to deny
coverage for claims involving lead paint poisoning, carbon monox
ide poisoning, and workplace accidents that incidently involve
chemicals, even though such denials extend well beyond the under
standing of the exclusion held by reasonable persons with the most
fervent commitment to hyperliteralism. 7 In addition, these insurers
frequently seek to make a morality play of insurance coverage liti
gation: policyholders (the same policyholders to whom the insurer
owes a near fiduciary relationship) are demagogically deemed "pol
luters," obvious bad guys who should be stripped of the insurance
5. See infra notes 45-74 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for lack of
compelling case for mandating Employers' Liability Insurance ("ELI") coverage of sex
ual harassment claims). Regarding the mandatory nature of we insurance coverage
and its differences from conventional liability insurance, see ARlHUR LARSON & LEX
K. LARSON, 9 LARSON'S WORKERS' CoMPENSATION § 92 (1999).
6. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reason
able Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CoNN.
INS. L.J. 181,245-77 (1998) (criticizing textual literalism as a school of contract interpre
tation and advocating a reasonable role for factors of intent, purpose, and expectation
in construing contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Constru
ing the "Absolute" Exclusion in Context and in Accord with its Purpose and Party Ex
pectations, 34 TORT & INs. LJ. 1, 7-17, 33-35, 58-59 (1998) (reviewing basic contract
principles and concluding that mainstream contract construction is not literalist or re
stricted solely to dictionary analysis of text; criticizing certain insurers for attempting to
tum contract litigation into a "morality play" about whether policyholder is a bad "pol
luter"); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong
Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L. REv.
463 (1998) (criticizing Florida Supreme Court's formal and hyperliteral application of
pollution exclusion to bar coverage for claims against an architectural firm when a
blueprint machine overturned and spilled ammonia).
7. See Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6, at 1-5; William P. Shelley &
Richard e. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort
Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?, 33 TORT & INS.
L.J. 749-50 n.1 (listing cases where pollution exclusion defense was not successful for
toxic tort claims) & n.2 (listing cases where pollution exclusion was held to bar such
"toxic tort" claims, or claims where chemicals were involved).
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coverage they thought they were buying.s
Despite the different nature of the coverage disputes, the
Schmidt v. Smith decision mirrors, to a significant degree, the errors
of insurers and sympathetic courts that have over-applied the pollu
tion exclusion. In both types of coverage disputes, the courts have
made· an overbroad application of the exclusion. Specifically, III
Schmidt v. Smith:
• Language is read hyperliterally rather than with sufficient ap
preciation of background, context, and purpose of the insuring
agreement;
• Public policy preferences are turned into mandates that over
ride other indicia of contract meaning; and
• An unanticipated result obtains, one at odds with the expecta
tions of at least several interested parties, in this instance the
insurer, the industry, and probably the employer and regula
tors as well.
Compared to the toxic tort cases, which deny coverage because
of the pollution exclusion, Schmidt v. Smith at least has the redeem
ing value of extending rather than constricting coverage, enhancing
the prospects for compensation of harassment and discrimination
victims, and imposing burdens on actors well suited to risk-bearing
and risk-spreading for profit. On the other hand, coniractenforce
ment and reliance interests take something of a beating in Schmidt.
Methodologically, the decision follows an interpretative fork that
one hopes is not a harbinger of future judicial action even though
the net impact of the decision may not be negative. 9
8. See Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6, at 33-35, 58-59 (criticizing
certain insurers for attempting to turn contract litigation into a "morality play" about
whether policyholder is a bad "polluter").
9. By contrast, I find no such silver lining in the decisions that construe the pollu
tion exclusion too broadly. See generally Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6;
Stempel, Unreason in Action, supra note 6. In the cases erroneously treating common
place liability claims as excluded "pollution," the policyholder is deprived of coverage
on which it relied, but the insurance industry, risk managers, and the public register no
comparable gain through the development of more affordable insurance or sounder risk
pools. Rather, a few insurers at certain fortuitous junctures obtain episodic relief from
their contract obligations, leading to modestly greater profits for the insurer that are
diluted and circulated to shareholders or consumed by constituents of the corporate
entity. In short, there is, to use the Supreme Court's memorable phrase from Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 u.S. 463, 478 n.2 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) and other cases
involving regulation of sexually explicit materials, "no redeeming social value" to the
overly broad and literal application of the pollution exclusion. By contrast, there may
be some positive aspects of Schmidt v. Smith despite the current dread it induces in
WCIEL insurers. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
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THE SCHMIDT V. SMITnl O LITIGATION

Lisa Schmidt filed a complaint against her employer, Personal
ized Audio Visual, Inc. ("PAV"), and its president, Dennis Smith,
alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation of
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), assault, bat
tery, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress. l l In an amended complaint, she also alleged liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress against Smith and negli
gent failure to train supervisors against PAV.12
PAY and Smith sought defense and indemnity coverage from
United States Fidelity & Guaranty ("USF&G") under a Compre
hensive General Liability ("CGL") policy and later under an Em
ployer's Liability ("EL") policy.B USF&G denied coverage under
both policies. 14 The trial of the discrimination action preceded the
trial of the coverage dispute. IS USF&G had the opportunity to par
ticipate in the defense, but refused. 16 At trial, the jury found Smith
liable for hostile work environment, sexual harassment, assault, bat
tery, and intentional infliction of emotional distressP The jury
found PAY liable only for hostile work environment sexual harass
ment. 18 The verdict form did not ask whether the employer's liabil
ity was direct or. vicarious or whether the employer might be
vicariously liable for the intentional torts committed by Smith. 19
After the jury verdict, the trial court found that USF&G was
responsible for coverage. 20 The intermediate appellate court af
firmed the trial court's verdict and found that PAY's EL policy pro
vided coverage even though its CGL policy did not.21 The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this result, but rejected in part the
reasoning of the appellate court. 22 The supreme court concluded
10. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
11. See id. at 1015-16.
12. See id. at 1016.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. (stating that the exclusion in the employer's liability coverage of the
WC policy was not applicable to sexual harassment claims when liability for those
claims was imposed vicariously); see also Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
684 A.2d 66,73-74 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996).
22. See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1018.
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that the language of the CGL policy did in fact operate to exclude
employment discrimination claims, but also held that such coverage
was statutorily required by state law requiring employers to make
arrangements for coverage of any bodily injury incurred by
workers. 23
The EL policy in question stated that it covered damages ac
cruing to the employer for occurrences of "'bodily injury by acci
dent or bodily injury by disease,' which arises 'out of and in the
course of the injured employee's employment' by the insured."24
However, the EL policy also contained an exclusion for damages
"arising out of coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, disci
pline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination against
or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, poli
cies, acts or omissions."25
The court found the broad language of this exclusion was tex
tually applicable in the Schmidt claim because the damages for
which PAY was liable were damages "arising out of" harassment. 26
However, the court also found that the exclusion could not be en
forced against PAVor Smith because the exclusion was inconsistent
with New Jersey law that requires employers to "make sufficient
provision for the complete payment of any obligation [the em
ployer] may incur to an injured employee."27
Specifically, the supreme court held that because Schmidt's
claim was based in part on a finding of negligence by the employer
and supervisor,28 her injuries were of the type for which bodily in
jury coverage for workplace mishaps was mandated by state stat
ute. 29 Consequently, application of the harassment exclusion in the
EL policy to Schmidt's injuries resulting from negligence violated
New Jersey law and was unenforceable (even though the negligent
injury was related to or resulted in claims of harassment).
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id.
Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 1018.
27. Id. at 1015 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-71 (West 1988».
28. Although the jury did not specifically make a finding of negligence or vicari
ous liability against the employer, neither did it foreclose negligence, which was
pleaded by the plaintiff and on which evidence was presumably presented at trial. See
id. at 1016. Although the court did not elaborate on this point, it implicitly concluded
that the jury verdict must be viewed in the light most favorable to the employer policy
holder, which argued that the verdict, although arguably ambiguous, was one based on
negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing.
29. See id. at 1018.
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However, according to the supreme court, the harassment ex
clusion would be enforceable to bar coverage for claims that did not
fall within the statutorily mandated coverage for "accidental bodily
injury" (bodily injury not intended by the employer even though
other workers may have acted with intent to do harm). According
to the Schmidt court, state law does not require the employer to
provide coverage for claims that do not result in "bodily injury."30
Thus, an insurer's use of an exclusion to bar coverage for the finan
cial or reputational injury usually associated with "criticism, demo
tion, evaluation, and defamation," would normally be enforceable
since a policyholder "would not expect to be covered" in such cases,
making the exclusion "valid as long as the liability arising from
those discomforts is not related to bodily injury."31
The Schmidt court held that in the instant case, the employer's
liability was "primarily related to the personal injuries [the em
ployee plaintiff] suffered as a result of [the supervisor's] conduct."32
New Jersey law regards emotional injury accompanied by physical
manifestation as "bodily injury" under liability insurance policies. 33
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not disturb the intermediate
appellate holding that the employer's CGL policy, which included
an employment-related injury exclusion, did not provide coverage.
In another case decided the same day, American Motorists In
surance Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co. ,34 the court also excluded coverage
for harassment and wrongful termination claims under a standard
CGL policy. That decision makes clear that Schmidt was based not
on the specific language of the EL policy at issue, but on state law
and public policy mandating minimum insurance coverage for bod
ily injury to workers. American Motorists did not present these
statutory and public policy considerations. In American Motorists,
the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with age discrimination
and harassment claims made by a former employee of the policy
holder. 35 According to the court, the CGL's employment exclusion
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.; see also Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J.
1992).
34. 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998).
35. In American Motorists, John Piccialo had worked as a salesman for L-C-A
Sales for more than thirty years, until his termination in 1991 at age 67. See id. at 100S.
He sued, charging that he had been harassed into involuntary retirement because of his
age. See id. L-C-A sought coverage for the Piccialo suit under its CGL. See id. The
CGL contained the typical insuring agreement covering bodily injury claims against the
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language barred coverage for the employee's age discrimination
and harassment claims.
The American Motorists court found the employment claims
exclusion in the CGL to be broad, clear, and enforceable despite
the general rule that it is the insurer's burden to demonstrate the
applicability of the exclusion. 36 A unanimous court found that this
burden was met because the exclusion was "clear and unambigu
ous," particularly given its location in the policy adjacent to an ex
clusion for workers' compensation claims.37 According to the
court, the plain language of the employment exclusion and its
placement in the policy
demonstrates that the objective of the CGL policy was to exclude
from coverage all claims-whether falling within or beyond the
workers' compensation system-"arising out of and in the course
of" [Plaintiff's] employment. Were the employee exclusion inter
preted only to bar coverage for workers' compensation claims,
the workers' compensation exclusion in LCA's CGL policy
would be redundant. 38

In addition, the court applied an expansive meaning to the ex
clusion's "arising out of' language, and equated the term with
"originating from," "growing out of," or "having a 'substantial
nexus' with the activity for which coverage is provided."39 Conse
quently, plaintiff's claim that he was harassed by telephone calls at
home, as well as by actions at work, did not bring the claim within
the CGL coverage.
As evidenced by the juxtaposition of American Motorists and
Schmidt, the Schmidt court recognized that the EL insurer had uti
lized compellingly clear language excluding harassment and dis
crimination coverage, but refused to enforce that clear language
favoring the insurer because New Jersey state law requires the em
ployer to provide coverage for any workplace-related bodily injury
claims. In other words, the supreme court "rewrote" the insuring
agreement to require the EL insurer to provide broader coverage to
the employer. Effectively, the court created a new insuring agree
ment of "judge-made insurance."
policyholder and also contained the typical exclusionary language that there would be
no coverage for bodily injury to "[a]n employee of the insured arising out of and in the
course of employment by the insured." . Id.
36. See id. at 1013.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1010.
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INTERPRETA TIVE FACTORS IN CONSTRUING -INSURANCE
POLICIES AND STATUTES

Insurance policies are contracts and the ordinary rules of con
tract interpretation apply to insurance coverage disputes. In addi
tion, because of the technical nature of insurance, the structure of
the insuring process, and the control over contract language typi
cally exercised by insurers, conventional contract doctrines have
been fine tuned under insurance law. Although courts and com
mentators frequently refer to a divergence between "regular" con
tract law and insurance law, insurance coverage litigation, like
contract litigation, ordinarily turns on questions of textual interpre
tation conducted in light of the intent of the parties, the purpose of
the insurance policy at issue, the expectations of the parties, partic
ularly the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, and the im
pact of regulatory law and questions of public policy. Many of
these same rules apply for interpreting legislative enactments or ad
ministrative regulations.
A.

Text

The text of the policy is the primary basis for construction of
the policy and for decisions regarding coverage disputes. 4o Where
the text of an insurance policy is clear, admits of only one reason
able meaning, and does not render an absurd result, a court ordina
rily applies the text as written to decide the coverage question. 41
Where policy language is unclear, courts ordinarily consider other
factors in determining meaning. 42 However, under the long-stand
ing contract principle of contra proferentem ("against the drafter"),
ambiguous language is construed against the author of the policy,
which is nearly always the insurer. 43 Some courts invoke the contra
proferentem principle against the insurer as soon as the court deter
mines that the language at issue is ambiguous, but this is a minority
view. 44 Most courts first consider extrinsic evidence of meaning
40. For general principles of contract interpretation and construction of insurance
policies, see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACf DISPUTES § 4.04 (2d
ed.1999).
41. See, e.g., National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying Illinois law); In re Celotex Corp., 175 B.R. 98 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (enforc
ing broad asbestos exclusion in policy).
.
42. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 4.04, at 4-15.
43. See id. § 4.08, at 4-57.
44. See id. at 4-59 to 4-60.
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before applying the contra proferentem tiebreaker. 45
B.

Intent and Purpose

The principal determinant of meaning, other then the policy
text, is the intent of the parties. Many courts state that ascertaining
. the intent of the parties and construing the policy accordingly is the
chief judicial task. Therefore, the policy language has importance
not because of its status as the content of the instrument, but be
cause of its status as the most accurate embodiment of the intent of
the parties.46 However, even courts that treat intent as the primary
factor in contract interpretation usually will not consider extrinsic
evidence of intent where the policy language is seemingly clear and
sensible. 47
The purpose of the insurance policy48 combines with the intent
of the parties49 to provide extrinsic evidence for resolving ambigu
ous language and to guide the court in its determination of the
meaning of the text of the insurance policy.50 Because intent and
purpose are so closely related, there is a tendency among courts and
commentators to collapse the two. This Article uses "intent" to
connote the specific intent of the contracting parties in situations
where the parties in fact had relatively specific expectations regard
ing the meaning of certain terms and the resolution of potential
claims thought likely to result. In contrast, the "purpose" of the
insurance policy refers to the general function of the instrument
and its role in the risk management of the policyholder. For exam
ple, a policyholder may obtain CGL insurance to protect it from the
third-party claims normally levied against businesses of that type.
Thus, a restauranteur policyholder may not have a specific intent
that her CGL will cover claims for illness caused by an exotic bacte
ria or legionnaire's disease carried in the restaurant's ventilation
system, but views the purpose of the CGL as providing coverage for
claims if patrons allege that they became sick from eating in the
restaurant.
45. See id. at 4-60.
46. See id. § 4.04, at 4-15. See, e.g., Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d
411, 422 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying California law).
47. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25[b] (2d ed.
1996).
48. See STEMPLE, supra note 38, § 4.05.
49. See id. § 4.04.
50. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968).
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Reasonable Expectations

Related to both purpose and intent is the concept of reason
able expectations. As a consideration in contract interpretation,
reasonable expectations have long played a role. For example,
when policy language is unclear, courts normally give the language
the construction that would be accorded it by a reasonable policy
holder reader. 51 During the past 30 years, the reasonable expecta
tions concept in insurance law has been associated with the writings
of Judge Robert Keeton who, as a Harvard Law School professor,
enunciated in his scholarly writings a "reasonable expectations doc
trine" that not only employed the reasonable expectations concept
to construe doubtful policy language, but also posited that insur
ance policies should be construed to effect the objectively reason
able expectations of the policyholder, even in cases where
"painstaking" analysis of the text of the policy would have negated
those expectations. 52
The expectations of policyholders as an interpretative tool has
been utilized most often when clear contract language excluding
coverage exists in the policy but is "hidden" or "confusing" or "de
ceptive" because of its location in the policy. On relatively rare
occasions the reasonable expectations concept has been invoked to
overcome clear contract language that is not hidden or "sneaky,"
but would operate to negate an essential coverage function of the
policy.
D.

Interpretative Groundrules of Statutory Construction

Although a substantial commentary on statutory interpretation
lies well beyond the scope of this Article, some comment on this
body of law is required to appreciate the bold breadth of Schmidt v.
Smith.53 Although courts and commentators have tended to treat
the construction of statutes and insurance policies as two separate
realms, there are many interpretative similarities.

51. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 4.04 (discussing role of reasonable construction
under traditional ground rules for contract construction); § 4.09 (discussing the reason
able expectation doctrine applied as a specific school of insurance contract interpreta
tion). See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987),
rev'd, 888 F.2d 747, 749 (11th Cir. 1989). For a further discussion of the reasonable
expectations approach as a theory of insurance policy interpretation, see Stempel, Un
met Expectations, supra note 6, at 181 and Abraham, supra note 4, at 1151.
52. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provi
sions Pan I, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions Pan II, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1970).
53. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
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Statutory interpretation of insurance law, while an area of
greater debate and less doctrinal consistency than exists for con
tracts, nonetheless resembles contract jurisprudence a great deal.
The statutory text is very important, but is not interpreted literally
or with excessive formalism and brittleness. Statutory language is
the most important factor, but questions of specific legislative intent
and general legislative purpose are also frequently utilized by
courts to decide cases. 54
E.

Comprehensive Approaches to Construction of Statutes and
Insurance Policies

To a degree, intent, purpose, and expectation overlap consider
ably and commingle in influencing judicial interpretation of insur
ance policy text. Although expectations analysis is typically viewed
as focusing on the understanding of the policyholder, many cover
age doctrines tending to favor insurers can be seen as part of the
broader principle that the scope of policy coverage must be consis
tent with the objectively reasonable expectations of both insurer
and policyholder. For example, the principles that only "fortuitous"
losses are covered55 and that a policyholder may not recover more
than it has lost (the "indemnity" principle)56 need not be codified in
the policy to be utilized to deny coverage to a policyholder who
intentionally brought about a loss or who is seeking a duplicative
recovery exceeding his own losses. In addition, the rule that a poli
cyholder must have an insurable interest in the object of the insur
ance 57 could be regarded as another extension of the reasonable
expectations doctrine favoring insurers.
F.

Statutes, Regulation, and Public Policy
Insurable interest and other aspects of insurance law may be

54. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial
Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. ToL. L. REv. 583, 589 (1991)
(reviewing major statutory interpretation approaches of textualism, intentionalism, and
purposivism, as well as evolutive, pragmatic, and free inquiry approaches to construing
statutes).
55. See. STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 1.05[a1for a more detailed discussion of the
fortuity principle.
56. See id. § 1.03 for a more detailed discussion of the indemnity principle.
57. See id. § 1.04. The insurable interest doctrine provides that a policyholder
cannot reasonably expect to obtain money for the loss of something in which he has no
insurable interest.
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substantially regulated by statute. 58 Much of the regulatory appara
tus surrounding insurance is addressed to the solvency of insurers,
their investment behavior and financial strength, and to issues of
marketing, consumer protection, and remedies for insurer misbe
havior. Some state insurance regulation also involves construction
of the insurance contract itself. In addition, courts may consult the
overall regulatory scheme of insurance in deciding coverage ques
tions and fashioning remedies. Courts may determine insurance
coverage disputes based on public policy considerations drawn from
the court's interpretation of the statutory scheme or derived from
other statutes or the common law. 59
Judicial restriction of the reach of "unconscionable" contract
terms can be seen as judicial decision-making decision based on
public policy. Coupled with the statutory system of regulating in
surance, each state has a department of insurance charged with ap
plying the state insurance laws and empowered to promulgate and
enforce regulations in that mission. Courts often take cognizance
of the position of the insurance regulators on issues of public policy
and construction of state statutes.
III.

SCHMIDT

v.

SMIT~: EXCEEDING REASONABLE

EXPECI'ATIONS AND OVERMANDATING INSURANCE

The array of insurance policy interpretive factors discussed
above form a considerable arsenal for courts attempting to decide
insurance coverage disputes. However, within this universe policy
text is the first among equals regarding contract meaning and legal
effect. Close behind is any specific understanding of each party's
intent. 60 The purpose of the policy and the expectations of the par
ties are less overtly invoked as a basis of decision, but hold signifi
cant importance in determining insurance disputes. Notions of
public policy are generally used only in rare cases unless there is an
express statutory or regulatory directive compelling a particular re
sult. The restricted role of such public policy considerations stems
58. See generally id., Ch. 2 (regarding government regulation of the insurance
business and insurance product).
59. See id.
60. I also include much of the law of equitable estoppel and waiver (and even
promissory estoppel) in this category. These doctrines, to a considerable degree, decide
insurance disputes based on some notion of intent of at least one of the parties, usually
the insurer, which has reflected an intent to do something for the policyholder, or to
refrain from invoking a defense. For further discussion of waiver and estoppel, see
STEMPEL, supra note 38, Ch. 5.
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from the traditional Anglo-American view that courts should de
cide cases by applying law and refrain from activity that smacks too
much of "making" law or "judicial activism" based on the court's
own notions of what is good or juSt.61
The Schmidt v. Smith 62 decision comes as a surprising and dis
orienting decision in large part because, despite clothing itself in the
language of a statutory "command," it creates coverage extending
considerably beyond what appears to have been actually contem
plated by either insurers or others involved in the relevant mar
ket. 63 Schmidt v. Smith is one of those rare cases that (at least to
date) has been discussed far more in the secondary literature than it
has been cited by other courts. In fact, despite the path breaking
nature of Schmidt, it has been cited by only one other court,64
although future Schmidt-like decisions may be in the metaphorical
pipeline of pending litigation. 65
To appreciate the degree to which mandatory employment dis
crimination coverage expands the concept of we and EL insur
ance, one needs to recall the circumstance that bore the workers'
compensation system. Prior to the advent of workers' compensa
tion laws, workers worked, quite literally, at their own risk. An em
ployee who was injured on the job had recourse in the courts, but
could obtain compensation only if he or she successfully shouldered
the burden of proving negligence by the employer. In addition to
the practical logistical barriers established by the common law
61. See Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 6, at 265-72.
62. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
63. See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16; Hays, supra note 2, at 4.
64. As of the date of publication of this Article, there. was only one case citing
Schmidt v. Smith in the LEXIS-NEXIS "Mega" database, which includes all state and
federal cases recorded by LEXIS: American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713
A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998). Although this would ordinarily not be unusual for such a recent
case, it appears to me most significant because Schmidt was widely reported in the
insurance trade press and even in the legal trade press. As noted above, supra note 3,
the New Jersey Supreme Court is well-known and traditionally closely watched in mat
ters of insurance law. In addition, most state workers' compensation laws have lan
guage very similar to, if not identical with, the New Jersey language held by the Schmidt
court to compel coverage. One would have expected at least the first salvo by claimants
in other states seeking expanded coverage and compensation.
65. See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that after Schmidt, "[I]nsurers are
sifting through options for dealing with the ruling and some attorneys agree that old
cases might be reopened. One carrier has already logged a jump in such claims"). Ac
cording to sources at New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, "125-150 discrim
ination cases have already come in" since Schmidt, a number characterized as "a lot of
activity" in that the insurer, which claims 20 percent of the New Jersey market, had not
seen "any" such claims prior to Schmidt. See id. at 17.
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method (e.g., was the injury severe enough to warrant a claim; did
the worker even know a lawyer or how to find one; would a lawyer
take the matter on contingency; if not, could the worker afford legal
representation), employers could avail themselves to an array of
common law defenses, such as the "fellow servant rule," which pro
vided that the employer was not legally liable for worker injuries
brought about by the negligence of co-workers. In its most extreme
form, the fellow servant rule barred recovery where the employer
was negligent but the co-worker was more negligent or exhibited
negligence that was an intervening and superseding cause of the
worker's injury. Assumption of risk also provided a powerful de
fense to employers, as did contributory negligence. In short, rec
ompense for an injured worker, like work itself, was no bed of roses
for laborers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The advent of workers' compensation legislation changed
much of the legal landscape in favor of the worker. 66 Employers
were made strictly liable for workplace injuries taking place in the
ordinary course of employment, and the fellow servant defense was
abolished. 67 Defenses such as assumption of risk were also abol
ished, although employers could still defeat claims if the injured
worker engaged in "willful misconduct" or was outside the scope of
employment at the time of injury.68 In return, employers did not
face jury trials over the injuries and injured workers were compen
sated according to a schedule of benefits.69
While the average worker did not fare as well from the early
20th century reforms as did railroad workers (who could sue under
favorable circumstances provided under the Federal Employers Li
ability Act ("FELA")),7° the conventional wisdom is that even with
66. Regarding the pre-existing common law and the changes made by workers'
compensation statutes, see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.02, 1.03, 2.01-.05,
2.06-.08. New Jersey's statute, first enacted in part in 1911, is representative. See Na
tional Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 392 A.2d 641, 642 (N.J. 1978).
67. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.01-.03, 2.03-.05.
68. See id. §§ 30.01-38.06. The willful misconduct defense of the employer,
although hardly toothless, is substantially less powerful than the common law doctrines
such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. For example, benign but fool
ish horseplay does not bar recovery under the workers' compensation law, but would
frequently be claim-barred negligence by the employee at common law.
69. See id. §§ 2.07-.08.
70. The Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.c. §§ 51-60 (1994), was enacted
in 1908. It permits railroad workers to sue over work-related injuries in either state or
federal court, but does not allow defendants to remove state court actions to federal
court. See id. § 56. The worker plaintiff need only prove some negligence on the part
of the railroad (not the preponderance normally required to prevail in tort litigation),
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political compromise, workers' compensation reforms generally im
proved the situations of employees. Today, there remains signifi
cant debate about the efficacy of the workers' compensation
system. Employers consistently complain about high benefit levels,
high premiums, and significant fraud and abuse in the system.
Workers, their attorneys, and labor advocates argue that the benefit
schedules are too low, resulting in undercompensation for many
InJunes.
At the time of enactment of workers' compensation legislation
during the early 20th century, there was, of course, no state or fed
eral antidiscrimination law. At common law, employers were given
an absolute right to discriminate against workers based on race,
creed, color, ethnicity, or gender. Nothing short of physical vio
lence against the worker was actionable, and even that appears to
have been widely permitted as a practical matter under certain cir
cumstances.71 Although the post-Civil War civil rights statutes had
been enacted, the greatest potential aid to workers, 42 U.S.c.
§ 1981, which provides a cause of action to one who is discriminated
against in the making of a contract because of race, was not given
full effect and enforcement until the Supreme Court decided Run
yon v. McCrary.7 2 Furthermore, § 1981 is limited to cases of racial
discrimination, and while it may also protect ethnic groups, it
clearly does not outlaw gender discrimination.
..
To perhaps belabor the obvious, the overarching theme of
workers' compensatio~ law was not to attack invidious discrimina
but any resulting award is reduced according to the plaintiff's percentage of negligence.
See id. § 53. FELA plaintiffs are not subject to a schedule of benefits or any cap on
awards and may recover counsel fees and punitive damages. Thus, although workers'
compensation laws are generally regarded as a victory for the labor movement, they are
hardly as pro-work~r as FELA. Ct. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, § 2.08, at 2-16
(containing a more restrained characterization of the differences in the statutes and
stating that FELA "is regarded by some segments of railway labor as preferable to
workers' compensation acts" (footnote omitted».
71. Regarding the history of employment discrimination law and the absence of
significant prohibitions on job discrimination prior to the 1960's, see MICHAEL J. ZIM
MER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-32 (4th ed.
1997).
72. 427 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs alleging race discrimina
tion in seeking to gain admission of child to private school stated a claim for race dis
crimination under the statute). The force of Runyon v. McCrary was significantly
curtailed in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,171 (1989), which held that
a bank teller harassed on the basis of her race did not state a claim under § 1981 since
the harassment did not involve prohibition on contracting per se because of race. See
also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 69, at 95 (noting that the Patterson holding was legisla
tively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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tion in the workplace, but to give workers monetary relief for the
sort of physical injury that occurred as an ordinary consequence of
work, particularly physical labor. Workers' compensation law was
originally intended to apply to flesh-and-blood workplace injury
and was so structured.73 Over the years, interpretation of the stat
ute has evolved and the concept of physical injury has expanded to
encompass stress-related ulcers, carpal tunnel syndrome, job-in
duced phobia, and the like.74
Without a doubt, workers' compensation was not intended to
be a job discrimination compensation system. Laws against dis
crimination did not arrive until the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 75 The
New Jersey statute relied upon by the Schmidt court was enacted in
1917. Although the 1964 Act prohibited gender discrimination,76 it
was not widely construed to prohibit sexual harassment (as opposed
to outright refusal to hire or promote women) until the Supreme
Court's 1986 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 77 decision. For
decades, workers' compensation legislation was referred to as
workmen's compensation law-nomenclature that persists even to
day among the less socially enlightened. Making workers' compen
sation law into antidiscrimination law engrafts onto the statutory
scheme a good deal more than was historically envisioned.
Against this historical backdrop, it is more than fair to argue
that the web of American antidiscrimination law is not part of the
fabric of workers' compensation law, but is instead a separate sec
tion of the law of civil liability. This is reflected not only by the
presence of separate statutory schemes, case law, and doctrines
governing both bodies of law, but in the organization of the legal
profession as well. For example, the workers' compensation bar is
distinct from the employment discrimination bar, with relatively lit
tle overlap. Workers' compensation and job discrimination have
73.
74.
75.

See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.01-.04.
See id. §§ 50.01-.07, 51.01-.05, 52.01-53.05, 56.01-.06.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1994).
See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ironically, but fortunately, gender discrimination was
added to the Act by its opponents, who were erroneously confident that a law barring
gender discrimination would fail even if one outlawing race discrimination would not.
But to the surprise of the smug sexists of Congress, other leaders and the public reacted
positively to the addition of gender to the bill and sex discrimination remained prohib
ited in the enacted final version of the law. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PInLIP P.
FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 15-16 (2d
ed. 1995). See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DE
BATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
77. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (construing sexual harassment to be a form of gender dis
crimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).

76.
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traditionally been two separate spheres of law and largely continue
in that vein.
Because workers' compensation legislation is broadly worded
to apply to any "bodily injury," one can make a substantial case
that workers' compensation and related legislation applies to bodily
injury caused at the workplace, regardless of whether its source is
discrimination or sexual harassment. Schmidt v. Smith 78 presents a
particularly compelling case for construing the law broadly. Lisa
Schmidt was not merely upset over workplace sexism. She testified
that she was physically assaulted by her boss on repeated occasions,
and that as a result, she experienced anorexia, bulimia, and at
tempted suicide on four occasions. 79 Clearly, Lisa Schmidt's inju
ries were bodily injuries for which the perpetrator and the employer
should be held legally responsible. But this determination begs the
question of whether the employer's WCIEL carrier should pick up
the tab for this liability when the insurance policy contained an irre
futably clear exclusion of such claims.
Recall that WC insurance is marketed in tandem with EL in
surance. As the Schmidt court itself observed, EL coverage is "tra
ditionally written in conjunction with workers' compensation and is
intended to serve as a 'gap-filler' providing protection to the em
ployer in those situations where the employee has a right to bring a
tort action despite provisions of the workers' compensation stat
ute."80 The typical WC policy (and statute) exempts from coverage
the employer's "serious and willful misconduct, the knowing em
ployment of a worker in violation of the law ... and failure to com
ply with health and safety laws."81 To fill the normal gaps existing
between its WC coverage and its CGL coverage, the employer poli
cyholder normally purchases EL coverage, which is "designed to
protect the employer against liability from traditional physical in
jury torts that may be brought by an employee."82 Thus, under
New Jersey law, as elsewhere, an employer's WC policy does not
cover the intentional torts committed by one co-worker against an- .
other. However, such acts are ordinarily covered under EL poli
78. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
79. See Schmidt v. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd,
713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
80. Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1017 (quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry
Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1986)).
81. STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.01[a], at 21-6 to 21-7.
82. Id. § 21.03, at 21-11.
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cies, as long as the intentional injury was committed by the co
worker, rather than the employer as an entity.
Writing prior to the Schmidt v. Smith decision, this author ven
tured that EL policies without language excluding coverage for em
ployment claims could prove to be a crossroads of litigation over
coverage:
Notwithstanding that the drafters of the EL probably did not in
tend to cover discharge and job discrimination claims (although
they probably did not have a specific intent to exclude them
either), the language of an EL may permit a policyholder to
claim coverage that is denied in the CGL.83

Policyholders without language in their EL policies that specifically
addresses the issue of discrimination liability can make a good case
for coverage, although case law is divided.84 However, "a welI
drafted exclusion for employment-related harassment or discrimi
nation claims should be enforceable .... "85
In Schmidt, the USF&G EL policy at issue stated straightfor
wardly that the EL insurance did not cover "[d]amages arising out
of coercion . . . harassment . . . discrimination . . . any personnel
practices, policies, acts or omissions."86 As the Schmidt court ob
served, this exclusion is sufficiently understandable that a reason
able policyholder would realize that discrimination and harassment
claims are not covered; and clearly, the damages for which PAY
(the employer) was liable in Schmidt were damages stemming from
sexual harassment.87
83. Id.
84. See id. at 21-14.
85. Id. (noting that recently issued EL policies "tend to include such exclusionary
language").
86. Schmidt v. Smith, 713 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. 1998).
87. See id. at 1018. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the intermediate
appellate court, which had engaged in considerable contortion to find that the insurer's
harassment exclusion was ambiguous, in order to invoke the contra proferentem princi
ple and construe the policy against the insurer and in favor of coverage. See Schmidt v.
Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd, 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J.
1998).
The New Jersey Supreme Court's rhetoric is perhaps a bit lukewarm in finding the
harassment exclusion sufficiently clear to merit enforcement absent public policy con
cerns. The court stated that "the phrasing of the exclusion is not 'so confusing that the
average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.'" Schmidt, 713
A.2d at 1018 (quoting Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979». But
read fairly, the Schmidt exclusion is better than merely "non-confusing." It admits only
one reasonable understanding: the EL policy in question and the issuing insurer did not
contract to undertake coverage for sexual harassment or employment discrimination
claims against PAY.
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Under these circumstances it is clear that as a matter of con
tract interpretation the insurer did not need to cover the Schmidt
claim. Nearly every standard indicia of contract meaning points in
this direction: clear text; seeming intent of the parties; the purpose
of the WC/EL policies and the exclusion, which is particularly com
pelling in light of the history of WC and EL coverage; as well as the
reasonable expectations of the parties. The insurer clearly did not
intend to provide such coverage. The average policyholder reading
this exclusion could not form a reasonable belief that it had cover
age, since both the language of the policy and the traditional func
tion of EL policies does not provide such coverage.
Arrayed against this veritable deck of interpretative factors
favoring the insurer, the Schmidt court invoked essentially one
trump card: New Jersey law requires employers to obtain insurance
coverage for all work-related bodily injuries suffered by workers. 88
According to the court:
In order to assure that this statutory remedy given in lieu of a
common law remedy is not illusory, the Legislature has required
that every employer carry Workers' Compensation insurance.
Those policies must cover not only claims for compensation pros
ecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for
work-related injuries asserted in a common law court. . . . In
short, the terms of a policy cannot conflict with the statutory
mandate that there be coverage provided for all occupational
injuries. 89

Although this is an important statutory mandate required of em
ployers, it hardly follows that insurers violate the law by selling em
ployers an insurance product subsequently found by a court to be
insufficiently comprehensive in its bodily injury coverage. Despite
the "semi-public" nature of WCIEL insurance,9o the court effected
an expansion of the insurance status quo not envisioned (much less
commanded) by the legislature when it held not only that the in
surer and employer are subject to the statutory mandate, but that
remedy for failing to provide this coverage is court-mandated
coverage.
The language in Schmidt quoted above is grounded in prece
dent which holds that insurance sold to fulfill an employer's WC
and EL insurance needs must be as broad as the statutory mandate
88.
89.
90.

See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1018.
Id. at 1016-17.
See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, § 92.
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imposed on employers. But this approach may impose unnecessary
burdens on WCIEL insurers in relation to other commercial actors
such as the employers themselves. Even if under New Jersey law an
employer's mandate must be the insurer's mandate, it remains un
clear as to whether harassment and discrimination fall within that
mandate, in view of the distinctions between discrimination claims
and traditional workers' compensation claims. Unfortunately, the
Schmidt court did not linger over these questions; instead, it leapt
to a broad, compulsive reading of the statute in order to override a
clear contract exclusion.
As noted above, insurance sold to employers to fulfill their
workers' compensation obligations is more public than the average
insurer-policyholder contract. In defense of the Schmidt court, it
can be said that the leading treatise on workers' compensation, as a
matter of black letter law, emphasizes the requirements imposed on
WCIEL insurers by courts pursuant to the statutes:
Since compensation insurance is for the benefit of the em
ployee as well as of the employer, some of the usual incidents of
insurance are modified for the employee's protection. Defenses,
such as nonpayment of premiums or breach of policy conditions,
which the insurer might have against the employer, are not avail
able against the employee. Moreover, under many statutes, a
policy cannot be canceled merely by action of the insurer, the
employer or both; notice to the compensation commission is or
dinarily required, followed by an interval in which replacement
of the insurance can be effected. The compensation commission
has jurisdiction to pass upon questions of compensation insur
ance when they affect the rights of the employee, while questions
purely between the insurer and insured may remain within the
jurisdiction of the courtS.91
The distinctive feature of compensation insurance is that,
although it arises from a contract between the employer and the
carrier, it creates a sort of insured status in the employee that
comes to have virtually an independent existence. The insurance
carrier therefore stands in two relations: to the employer, to pro
tect it from the burden of its compensation liability, and to the
employee, to ensure that he or she gets the benefits called for by
the statute. The former relation is governed largely by the insur
ance contract; the latter is ~overned by the statute.92

Thus, a significant number of insurer defenses that are other
91. Id. § 92, at 17-1 (emphasis removed).
92. Id. § 92.21, at 17-14 to 17-16.
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wise available against the employer are not permitted to defeat an
employee's claim for coverage under the policy. These include mis
representation, concealment, failure to report compensation, failure
to give proper notice, unauthorized assignment, and other arguable
breaches of a policyholder's duty of cooperation and good faith.93
Furthermore, "[T]he law has undertaken to compel a certain mini
mum coverage in insurance contracts, regardless of any narrower
agreement between insurer and employer."94
Accordingly, there is conventional wisdom that may be cited
for support by the Schmidt court: "[I]f a compensation policy is
written at all, the insurer will frequently find that the scope of its
liability to employees is taken completely out of the hands of the
parties to the insurance contract and dictated by the law of the
state."95 However, the treatise writers making this statement say
mandated insurance under the statute is designed mainly to prevent
insurers from "cherry picking" the best risks while refusing others.
Their overall discussion of required coverage focuses on the pre
sumed legislative intent of having WCIEL insurance cover all as
pects of the employer's operations. 96 However, there appears to be
no clear mandate to require particular forms of coverage outside of
the traditional core of coverage provided for typical workplace
physical injury.
Therefore, despite the differences between WCIEL insurance
and CGL insurance, the Schmidt court clearly could have been
more flexible and fair with the insurer regarding the case remedy.
Notwithstanding previous cases construing employer mandates to
be insurer mandates, the court could have also recognized that in
this case inadequate insurance was the employer's problem and not
the insurer's problem. For example, the court could have made its
decision prospective only. Prior to Schmidt, most casual observers
would have reasonably expected that clear exclusionary language in
an insurance policy would have been enforced when the nature of
the exclusion was consistent with the general grant of coverage.
In addition, the court could easily have held the employer re
93. Seeid. at 17-17.
94. Id. § 93.10, at 17-99.
95. Id.
96. See id. §§ 93.10, 93.20-.30, at 17-99, 17-106, 17-108. Consequently, when it is
said that New Jersey has "one of the stiffest types" of "full-coverage" workers' compen
sation statutes, it must be emphasized that the treatise authors refer to a requirement
that there be coverage of the full range of the employer's operations, not that there
must be coverage (even if clearly excluded) for all manner of the employer's liability
creating activities and consequences. See id. § 93.20, at 17-104.
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sponsible for deficiencies in such newly minted mandatory cover
age. It is the employer to whom the statutory mandate is directed.
Even if the insurer was contributing to the delinquency of the em
ployer by issuing an EL policy that did not include full coverage for
all manner of work-related bodily injuries, it is by no means clear
that the appropriate remedy is to force the insurer into providing
the coverage it thought it had excluded and which the court con
cluded was excluded by the clear language of the insurance policy
at issue. Furthermore, it does not appear that state regulators in
any way disapproved of the exclusion for discrimination or harass
ment found in the policy at issue in Schmidt. Although the more
express exclusion at issue in the case is relatively new, it was hardly
secret and may even be commonplace in most WClEL policies. 97
Statutory mandates of employer financial responsibility are im
portant in the law. So, too, is judicial enforcement of contracts. If
the court was determined to give its decision retroactive effect, a
better means of mediating any tension between these two legal val
ues (if the insurer is to be blamed at all) would have been to levy an
appropriate administrative fine upon the insurer for writing non
conforming coverage (albeit unintentionally in view of the path
breaking nature of the Schmidt decision). It is unlikely that even a
serious fine would have equaled the more than $181,000 for which
the insurer was held liable by the court (for insurance coverage that
the court found was expressly disclaimed).98
Beyond this seemingly excessive punishment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court's primary error remains its unduly broad reading of
the employer mandates of the statute. As noted above, WCIEL
coverage historically and functionally has been applied to physical
injuries that come from working under normal conditions gone
awry (e.g., a crushed finger in a punch press), even where the cover
age is under the EL policy for an intentional tort (e.g., a brawl be
tween co-workers arguing over respective responsibilities for curing
a defect in construction) rather than the WC policy for accidental
injuries. Traditionally, the expected scope of EL coverage has not
97. The initial policy issued to PAY excluded coverage for "[d]amages arising out
of the discharge of, coercion of, or discrimination against any employee in violation of
the law," language that when properly read would exclude the claim in Schmidt. Prior
to the Schmidt incidents, the exclusion was amended to its more exclusionary form.
The new exclusion barred coverage not only for discrimination, but also for "harass·
ment," "humiliation," as well as for "any personnel practices, policies, acts or omis
sions." See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1017.
98. See id. at 1016 (noting the total award of $181,730.36 to plaintiff Schmidt
against PAY and Smith).
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included discrimination and harassment claims, at least not with
sufficient force to create an expectation that would override clear
exclusionary language. This is the case notwithstanding that the ba
sic state statute requires that the employer, not the insurer, have
sufficient means to satisfy bodily injury claims by workers.
To justify its abrupt and counterintuitive break in the law, the
Schmidt court did invoke precedent to buttress its view that insur
ers are equally bound by the statute that commands that employers
be capable of satisfying work-related claims by employees. Accord
ing to the Schmidt court, "USF&G must indemnify PAV, however,
for the same reason that New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
Company had to indemnity Variety Farms for its obligations to the
underage employee injured in that case. "99 Although citing the
1980 Variety Farms decision assists the Schmidt court's campaign to
suggest it is not engaging in the manufacture of new forms of man
dated EL coverage, Variety Farms is a relatively weak reed on
which to hang the substantial obligations imposed on EL carriers
under Schmidt.
In Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
Co. ,100 the employer hired a 15-year-old worker, underage by state
law, who was seriously injured at work. The youth worker sued for
workers' compensation benefits but the EL carrier refused, citing
an exclusion from coverage where the claim involved "any em
ployee employed in violation of hiw with the knowledge or acquies
cence of the insured or any executive officer thereof."101 The
Variety Farms court found the exclusion unenforceable because the
EL policy had implicitly been issued to the employer to comply
with the statutory workers' compensation and employer liability
coverage mandate. The court reasoned that the statutory goal of
adequate coverage for workers would be unreasonably defeated if
the insurer was permitted to enforce the exclusion. 102
Unlike Schmidt, however, the Variety Farms court grounded its
decision in the historical context of the movement toward workers'
compensation legislation and the traditional function of we and
EL insurance,103 invoking. precedent from National Grange Mutual
99.
696 (N.J.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1018 (citing Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980».
410 A.2d 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
Id. at 698.
See id. at 699-700.
See id. at 700.
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Insurance Co. v. Schneider.104 Quoting National Grange, the Vari
ety Farms court focused on the core function of the workers' com
pensation system.
[T]he minor's suit ... [must be] fitted consciously and appropri
ately into a complex and balanced system of compe'nsation for
work injuries .
. . . The statutes we deal with were necessary legislative reac
tions to 19th Century industrial excesses. The reformers who cre
ated workmen's compensation and factory law remedies. for
injured workers and industrially abused minors simply. would not
purposely deprive an illegally employed 13-year-old, who claims
injury by the negligence of his employer, insurance protection
granted routinely to almost everyone else. !Os

Both courts in Variety Farms and National Grange based their
decisions mandating coverage on the original intent of the legisla
ture enacting the workers' compensation system.. Both decisions
also relied on the historical context of the statute and the nature of
the instant claims, tragic but all-too-common physical injuries to un
derage employees operating dangerous machinery at work as part
of their ordinary workplace duties. In short, both decisions viewed
the coverage at issue as reasonably expected by the .participants in
the workers' compensation system, including the we and EL insur
ers, in light of the totality of the circumstances.
By contrast, Schmidt v. Smith 106 involved a type of claim far
removed from the original legislation and customary employer-in
surer expectations. Without in any way diminishing the seriousness
and wrongfulness of sexual harassment, it is clear that coverage for
sexual harassment and job discrimination is not wbat legislators,
employers, or insurers had in mind prior to the modern era of em
ployment litigation. In New Jersey, the statutory provision read so
broadly by the Schmidt court predates the sexual harassment cause
of action by more than 60 years. 107
Where the EL policy is silent on the topic, it is still appropriate
104. 392 A.2d 641 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). In National Grange, a 13
year-old meat market employee lost his right arm in a meat grinder accident. When the
youth sought benefits the insurer rejected coverage, citing the policy's illegal employ
ment exclusion. Both the National Grange and Variety Farms courts rejected this de
fense. See id. at 644.
105. Variety Farms, 410 A.2d at 701 (quoting National Grange, 392 A.2d at 644).
106. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
107. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that
"Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimina
tory intimidation, ridicule and insult").
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to find coverage for job discrimination and sexual harassment and
to reject insurer arguments that the harassment was not an "acci
dent," that emotional trauma suffered by the victim was not suffi
cient "bodily injury," or that certain relief for the victim does not
qualify as "damages."108 But where the insurer in most certain
terms excludes coverage for harassment, discrimination, and coer
cion on the face of an EL policy issued to a commercial policy
holder, any statutory or public policy case for coverage seems to
lack the force required to overcome such a clear exclusion.
Put another way, child labor and workers left incapacitated by
machines have long been part-and-parcel to the system of workers'
compensation and employer liability. Coverage for such claims is
justified even when policy language is substantially to the contrary.
Discrimination and harassment should not, in view of their relative
recency and disturbance of prior expectations, similarly override
contrary language in the policy.
Schmidt thus represents an exercise in judicial activism and
court-created insurance coverage that is not justified in view of the
circumstances of the claim, the language and purpose of the policy
at issue, the historical context and expectations of the parties, and
the availability of more apt remedies and means of fostering greater
EL coverage in the future. Despite its sympathetic factual situa
tion, Schmidt exceeds the bounds of legitimate judicial law-making
and contract reformation.
IV.

CONTINUING TENSION ON THE EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
FRONT: COMPENSATION, DETERRENCE, FAIRNESS,
AND EQUALITY

Beyond the suspect methodology of Schmidt, however, there
remains the harder question: even if Schmidt is bad law, is it good
policy? After decades of being the dirty little secret of the Ameri
can workplace, employee injuries for discrimination and harass
ment have finally received the serious attention they deserve. Title
VII is less than 35 years old, but has had, and continues to have, a
profound impact in the workplace. The sexual harassment compo
nent of Title VII protection accorded workers is barely a decade old
and has, during the 1990's alone, become a wellspring of litigation
and a source of employer concern and action. In 1998, the United
States Supreme Court decided four sexual harassment cases,109 sub
108. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.03.
109. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (holding the
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stantially clarifying the law in this area; an indication not only of the
growing importance of gender discrimination law, but also its rela
tive youth.
Without a doubt, the impact of discrimination law during the
final third of the 20th century has been enormous. While many em
ployers and social critics decry the trend,llo this author would like
to disassociate himself from the seeming backlash against discrimi
nation law. While surely there are weak and frivolous claims, the
"boom" in employment discrimination claims has, for the most
part, occurred because many employers or their agents have ille
gally engaged in discrimination and harassment grounded in gen
der, race, age, or ethnicity. Such conduct is illegal and its victims
deserve legal recompense. Its perpetrators should be held responsi
ble and in appropriate circumstances punished through exemplary
damages (or even incarceration for extreme cases such as assault,
battery, or rape).
Although critics may treat job discrimination, particularly sex
ual harassment claims, as the product of excessive political correct
ness or a new puritanism, this emerging area of litigation really
represents the first stages of a statutory movement toward social
equality. Protracted litigation, expense, and the occasional bogus
claim by the malcontent worker are simply the prices that must be
paid to apply this body of law, such that laudable social goals un
derlying the law are effected. Weak or frivolous contract claims are
brought with significant frequency, often by well-heeled litigants
who engage in costly wars of attrition. Yet no one suggests that the
legal system's establishment of enforceable contract rights was a
mistake that needs undoing. Rather, our legal system returns to the
ongoing task of separating the bona fide claims from those that
should not impose liability. Workers should have legal protection
against race and gender discrimination just as contracting parties
defendant vicariously liable for sexual harassment by lifeguard supervisors in absence
of effective city procedure permitting victims to report grievances); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Elierth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (finding that Title VII permits sexual harassment
claim even where plaintiff's refusal to submit to sexual advances did not result in dis
charge or lost promotion opportunities); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S.
Ct. 1989 (1998) (finding school district not liable under Title IX where student plaintiff
failed to report teacher's misconduct to responsible school officials); Oncale v. Sun
downer Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that Title VII applies to
same-gender sexual harassment).
110. See, e.g., WALTER B. OLSEN, THE EXCUSE FACTORY (1998) (criticizing the
creation of antidiscrimination rights, including protection accorded to workers under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and the ADEA, for fostering an atmos
phere of employee opportunism and workplace inefficiency).
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should have recourse to courts when contracts are breached, as in
vestors should continue to enjoy protection under the securities
laws, as victims of negligent injury should have the protection of
tort law, and so on.
But, to say that Title VII and similar statutes are wise and de
serve continued enforcement obviously does not answer the ques
tion of who should pick up the tab for defense, settlement, and
judgments occasioned by such claims. One school of insurance and
public policy thought argues that discrimination and harassment
claims should not be insurable at all because much of the conduct at
issue borders on the volitional. While one can certainly make a
case for requiring employers to internalize all costs of such claims, it
is an unconvincing case for several reasons.
• First, despite the "intentional act" sounding nomenclature of
terms like "race discrimination" and "sexual harassment," a large
amount of alleged workplace employment discrimination appears
to be the result of unconscious prejudices (e.g., attitudes about
whether women can understand machines or should be on the
road 300 days a year, or whether a 60-year-old account represen
tative still has the same zeal for his job), rather than an overt
dislike of women, racial minorities, or older workers. 111
Although some oppose recovery in such situations, they are
wrong. Discrimination, even if subconscious, nonetheless vio
lates the law and injures the affected worker. Relief should be
available, provided that the worker plaintiff can satisfy the
pragmatically tougher burden of proving that the adverse em
ployment decision really was the product of discrimination rather
than serendipity or a merits-based decision with which the plain
tiff merely disagrees.
• Second, even if the actor inflicting discriminatory treatment or
harassment is acting with hateful racism or sexism, this hardly
means that all defendants in the ensuing lawsuit are guilty of the
same malice. The corporate employer defendant, which is often
the deep pocket that will actually pay the resulting judgment or
111. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.04 (discussing varieties of intentional and
inadvertent discrimination and implications for insurance coverage); Ann C. McGinley,
The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the
Distinction Between Colorblind and Race·Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII,
39 ARIz. L. REv. 1003 (1997) (identifying unconscious discrimination against women
and minorities due to cronyism, social networks, unconscious stereotypes, and other
attitudes that fall short of conscious intent to discriminate against particular workers).
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settlement, frequently is not acting with malicious intent at all.
The employer's liability-creating "sin" may simply be that it
failed to establish a system for monitoring discrimination by indi
vidual employees, was unable to recognize discrimination in its
midst, or was unable to act forcefully enough to curb the individ
ual perpetrator and assist the victim. Such failures of recognition
or nerve, as the case may be, should not be condoned by the law,
but neither should they make this very real risk of doing business
uninsurable.
• Third, litigation claims may result in "false positives": incorrect
factfinder assessments that impose liability even when the de
fendant did not, in fact, discriminate, but simply treated the em
ployee badly or was a less sympathetic litigant than the
employee. Although these false positives do not occur with the
frequency suggested by some critics of employment discrimina
tion litigation (who, to paraphrase Will Rogers, never met a de
fendant they did not like), erroneous liability determinations in
discrimination claims do occur. Similarly, factfinders at times im
pose liability for breach of contract or fraud when the defendant
was merely a hard bargainer, or where a tort defendant manufac
tured a product that was safe if properly used, but the jury fails to
appreciate the plaintiff's misuse of the product. No one seriously
suggests that insurance should be unavailable for tort claims
(although the market may be difficult at times for such claims) or
that contract rights are a bad thing, even though they can lead to
controversial decisions like Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. ,112 which
imposed multibillion dollar liability on a company for what many
regarded as permissible business behavior (attempting to beat a
competitor by acquiring another company).
• Fourth, even if claims are properly characterized as marginal,
they can be costly for defendants. Even marginal claims have
some settlement value, particularly if the claimant has advan
tages of forum selection or natural sympathy from factfinders.
Even where the defendant adopts a "millions for defense but not
one cent for tribute" philosophy, the cost of defending such vir
tue may be high. Successful litigation is not cheap. It requires
legal counsel and related expenses irrespective of the merits of
the claim. While the frivolous claim may ordinarily be more eas
112. 481 U.S. 1,9 (1987) (reversing the federal court's attempt to enjoin enforce
ment of a multibillion dollar state court judgment and describing the facts of the state
court litigation).
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ily defeated without trial than the marginal claim, neither can be
eliminated for free. Certainly, strong but unsuccessful claims are
expensive to defeat, even though a judgment is never obtained
against the policyholder. To an extent, defendants lose even
when they win. 113
For all of these reasons, commercial actors should be able to obtain
insurance coverage for job discrimination claims. But, reaching this
conclusion still begs the question of how this risk should be man
aged and what insurance products should be deployed in the
operation.
To a large extent, the market has answered this question. Pri
vate insurers, left to their own devices, have established insurance
products dealing with employment-related claims. The primary ve
hicle, of course, is the WC policy in tandem with the EL policy.
These policies provide coverage for employee claims under state
workers' compensation law. This combined product addresses what
has been, and continues to be, the major source of workplace
claims: physical injury on the job that takes place in essentially the
ordinary course of business because of the nature of the work.
The EL policy supplements the WC policy by providing cover
age for similarly long-recognized physical injuries, resulting from
essentially inherent workplace hazards. As discussed above, the EL
policy was designed as a supplement to the WC policy ~nd was
probably never intended to apply to race and gender discrimination
claims.
The CGL and other liability policies are designed to cover
traditional risks of claims by third parties over the types of incidents
that normally occasion third-party lawsuits. Such claims include
conventional torts committed by workers or agents, claims arising
out of defective products, or business competition, including com
mercial disparagement and defamation claims.
When third-party liability claims are new or out-of-the-ordi
nary, insurers often resist these claims as outside the scope of in
113. Before anyone reaches for a handkerchief on behalf of litigation defendants,
I should add that the same holds true for plaintiffs. They may obtain a judgment, but
nonetheless have a net loss, because they were required to expend funds on counsel
fees and related expenses due to a defendant's tort, breach of contract, or statutory
violation. Sometimes the defendant seeks bankruptcy protection and the judgment
debt is discharged for pennies on the dollar. In addition, commercial litigants have the
advantage, in most cases, of deducting disputing costs from their income tax as a cost of
doing business. Individual litigants, like employees claiming job discrimination, ordina
rily have no such government subsidy for their claims.
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tended coverage, notwithstanding the literal breadth of language in
the liability policy. Take, for example, the emerging field of pollu
tion coverage. Insurers sought not to provide coverage for pollu
tion claims unless the pollution at issue was abrupt, since the policy
required that the discharge be "sudden and accidental," notwith
standing that most dictionaries list the first meaning of "sudden" as
"unexpected."1l4 In a related part of the pollution coverage saga,
insurers also resisted coverage of pollution-related claims under the
Personal Injury ("PI") section of the CGL, which provided cover
age (without a pollution exclusion) for a claim of "wrongful entry"
by the policyholder. Policyholders have argued (and have even had
some success in litigation) that seepage of toxic waste onto adjoin
ing property is a "wrongful entry" within the meaning of the
CGL.IIS

Although a thorough discussion of these coverage disputes lies
well beyond the scope of this Article, this author merely observes
that insurers resisting coverage in these cases argued against textual
literalism and in favor of policy construction that accords with the
purpose of the policies. Consider the stronger of the two previous
examples. The "wrongful entry" aspect of the PI coverage of the
CGL was aimed at conventional claims of trespass, and not at mod
ern pollution claims arising well after the policies were contem
plated and authored. Ordinarily, insurers should prevail in such
litigation even though the literal language of the CGL favors policy
holders on this point (a pollutant that seeps into the groundwater
does, after all, "enter" property and cause damage).1l6
Like pollution, employment discrimination claims are matters
for which traditional liability insurers seek to avoid coverage. Some
of this resistance may simply be fear of the new and unfamiliar.
More of it is fear of the actuarially new and difficult to calculate.
CGL insurers have long used language seeking to bar workplace
related claims. With the onset of discrimination claims, these insur
ers have steadily sought to strengthen this ·exclusionary language
and avoid covering employment discrimination claims altogether.
114. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 14.11[b] (discussing the history, evolution,
and current status of coverage litigation over the Qualifi~d Pollution Exclusion).
115. See id. § 14.05[b] (discussing the history, evolution, and current status of liti
gation seeking coverage for pollution claims under the Personal Injury part of the
CGL).
116. See id. (discussing how wrongful entry and trespass coverage provided under
Personal Injury provisions of the CGL was designed to cover traditional entry and tres
pass clainls, such as controversies between landlords and tenants, or property disputes
among neighbors, rather than pollution claims).
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Instead of having discrimination and harassment claims cov
ered under the CGL, the insurance industry's own conduct has sug
gested that insurers do not want such claims subject to the CGL,
but rather, that discrimination risks are better underwritten, priced,
and administered through an Employment Practices Liability
("EPL") policy. EPL policies differ from CGL and other liability
policies in a number of ways.u 7 The EPL policy is offered only in
the claims-made form. It is relatively expensive in relation to the
coverage limits provided. It contains a substantial deductible or
self-insured retention ("SIR"). The policies typically have an ag
gregate limit as well as a per claim limit, and may also have "burn
ing limits" where the costs of defending claims reduces the policy
limits available for paying claims. Most importantly, EPL insurance
is underwritten as a separate, specified risk. The insurer that offers
EPL coverage investigates the employer applicant with a particular
eye to the business in question, the workforce, and likely sources of
claims, including discrimination, sexual harassment, and similar
risks that have historically not been part of the underwriting investi
gation process for WC, EL, or CGL policies.1 18
In short, insurers either want to avoid discrimination and har
assment coverage altogether, via exclusions, or to monitor and con
trol it very tightly through writing only the specified risk EPL policy
for such coverage, so that they can better monitor loss experience
and adjust their risk with some alacrity. This is the behavior of an
insurance industry still getting its feet wet in EPL as an aspect of
liability insurance. There are signs that the EPL segment of the
insurance market is also showing the normal signs of development
within the industry. For example, during the past few years EPL
limits have gone up significantly while premium costs have gone
down substantially. One is reminded of calculators and personal
computers, where the cost of calculation or computation decreased
dramatically as the industry's learning curve brought greater manu
facturing efficiency.
117. See id. § 21.03 (describing EPL policy and its traits); see also ANDREW
KAPLAN ET AL., THE EPL BOOK: A PRAcrICAL GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT PRAcrICES
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 110-96 (1997) (describing policy structure, defense and set
tlement provisions, exclusions, definitions, conditions, and operation of EPL policy).
118. Although the EPL policy is generally viewed as a more prudent means of
accepting the risk of discrimination litigation coverage, it remains a relatively new prod
uct in a new area for insurers. See Jennifer L. Cox & Bernard E. Jacques, Risks of
EPLI Coverage Prove Difficult to Assess: Employment Practices Liability Insurance
Presents Risk Factors Not Found in Other Policy Forms, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1998, at
B14.
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Without being excessively sanguine about the mythical, all
knowing, all-responsive powers of the market (even the father of
market theory, Adam Smith, was not so rabid a cheedeader),119
one can see the insurance industry responding to employment dis
crimination claims as a type of business liability that insurers are
willing to insure-but only under certain conditions. Most impor
tantly, insurers appear unwilling to insure discrimination claims as
part of the package of traditional liability coverage for worker
claims (under WC or EL coverage) or typical third party claims (in
sured under the CGL).
Rather, the insurance industry has attempted to treat discrimi
nation claims like pollution claims (including government-ordered
pollution cleanup).12o Insurers also want these claims out of the
traditional bundle of liability coverage. Some insurers are willing to
write this coverage (there is a growing market of Environmental
Impairment ("EI") insurance just as there is a growing market of
EPL insurance) but only as a separate product, more carefully tai
lored to the risk and more closely monitored and controlled by the
insurer than is possible when the coverage is offered as part of an
omnibus package of more traditional coverage with which the in
dustry has more longstanding experience.
Although one should not worship markets too credulously,121
neither should one ignore them. Where a commercial market has
spoken, one should ordinarily start with the proposition that this
says something worth absorbing. One may, upon further analysis,
conclude that the market has erred because of historical, social,
political, or other factors, thus prompting one to favor government
119. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Knopf ed. 1991) (1776) (identifying market operation and
generally praising its effects, but admitting the need for certain external government or
social controls to permit markets to work well).
120. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 14.12 (describing a split in the courts regard
ing coverage under older CGL language and the insurance industry's move to a more
strongly worded exclusion barring coverage for government-mandated cleanup of pol
luted property).
121. As Anthony Kronman has observed:
You want to know what a really free market looks like? Go to Moscow. That's
a really free market. Market without law, without courts, where market grows
from the barrel of a gun. And why shouldn't it? In a perfectly free market,
when you begin to introduce the elements that distinguish our market from
Moscow's, what you see growing is the realm of law.
Anthony T. Kronman, Legal Professionalism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999) (arguing that to work well, markets require at least a critical minimum of regula
tion so that contracts are enforced and other rights protected to encourage investment
and growth).
THE
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intervention. At least at the outset, regulators (executive, legisla
tive, administrative, and judicial) should tread lightly before man
dating or barring conduct by actors in the private market. Unless
the market conduct in question implicates serious public health
risks or similar matters of urgency, caution is advisable before man
dating coverage.
Therein lies the core of my concern with the Schmidt v.
Smith 122 decision. As noted above, this author finds Schmidt troub
ling because of its overly broad approach to statutory construction
(even the construction of a remedial statute) and its willingness to
read a word with literal dictionary breadth and relatively little re
gard for the historical context and purpose of the statute. Literal
ism and extreme formalism are similarly troubling when applied to
the reading of insurance policies or other contracts. Many courts,
however, embrace such literalism and strict application of a seem
ingly "clear" facial meaning of contract or statutory text. Both
sides of this hermeneutic debate would find common ground in
holding that judicial overriding of contract language, on the basis of
a general statutory framework or over arching notions of public pol
icy, should take place only when necessary to override contract
meaning in the service of compelling or mandated socio-Iegal goals.
One searches in vain for that justification in Schmidt. The
court simply decided that because the workers' compensation stat
utes of New Jersey require employers to be responsible for bodily
injury claims by workers, any insurance purchased by an employer
must necessarily provide coverage for bodily injury stemming from
sexual harassment claims. Although it is good for claimants if de
fendants have insurance to pay claims, it is not socially required,
except in select circumstances. Auto insurance is the best example
outside workers' compensation insurance, but most states require
only minimal financial responsibility for those driving automobiles.
Furthermore, the impetus behind these "financial responsibility
laws" is that many drivers do not possess sufficient personal assets
to be financially responsible absent insurance. In order to promote
compensation for traffic accident victims, society mandates insur
ance for drivers, and the case law has tended to prevent such cover
age from being defeated by insurer defenses. 123
122. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
123. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 134 S.E.2d 654, 660 (N.C.
1964) (holding that under state mandated auto insurance, it makes no difference
whether the policyholder's acts were wilful, wanton, reckless,or negligent).
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For employer policyholders, the social reasons for mandating
coverage of discrimination claims are not as compelling.124 Most
employers, even the corner grocer and newsstands, have some as
sets from which an employee's discrimination or harassment claim
may be paid. Thus, the legislature's desire for adequate financial
responsibility of employers for the victims of discrimination will or
dinarily be satisfied without rewriting the insurance policy
purchased by the employer, which did not provide for coverage of
discrimination claims beyond the traditional core of workers' com
pensation and employers' liability claims.
The historical background. here is important. Traditionally,
WC and EL insurance coverage packages offered to the employer
did not envision providing protection for discrimination claims, and
in its modern form, contains clear and broad language designed to
eliminate coverage for such claims. Furthermore, according to
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co. ,125 decided
the same day, by the same New Jersey Supreme Court that issued
the Schmidt ruling, this language clearly and successfully excludes
such coverage. For the CGL insurer (in L-C-A), the exclusion is
enforced, but for the EL insurer in Schmidt, the same clear lan
guage was judicially nullified. Does the "semi-public" nature of
WC and EL insurance really justify such disparate treatment of
contracts?
All of this seeming judicial error is committed in the name of
enhancing coverage, although the case for the judicial mandate is
suspect. As noted above, the commercial actors likely to be dis
crimination defendants do have their own resources that are avail
able to satisfy such claims. Furthermore, these same commercial
actors purchased EL insurance that contained clear language ex
cluding coverage for claims such as those brought by Lisa Schmidt.
Where is the jurisprudential wisdom in providing such defendants
124. Even if it were as compelling as the auto insurance statutes' intent of foster
ing compensation for accident victims, this still would not support a wildly broad read
ing of the statute. As one court observed,
The entire [uninsured motorist] act is remedial in nature and is entitled to a
liberal construction to effectuate the purpose thereof. But ... it should not by
judicial interpretation be extended beyond the plain intent of the statute ....
Insurers may limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please
upon their obligations, provided such conditions are not in contravention of
some statutory inhibition or public policy.
Marchant v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 316 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (cita
tions omitted).
125. 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998).
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with coverage which they implicitly declined and for which they
never paid the requisite premium? Furthermore, despite the rather
new and relatively thin market for EPL coverage, it appears that
the insurance industry does provide coverage for defendants, such
as Dennis Smith and PAV, should they not wish to risk their per
sonal assets in the event of a discrimination claim.
Although broad-based insurance coverage is, in theory, a won
derful thing, whether it should be required is normally regarded as
a question for the legislature. Although Schmidt arguably is pre
mised on the notion that the New Jersey legislature has already
made this determination, this author suspects that this comes as
quite a revelation for the legislators who originally authored New
Jersey Statute section 34:15-72 some 50 years before Title VII was
enacted, and some 70 years before the Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson 126 decision declared that sexual harassment was actiona
ble under Title VII.127
At the risk of sounding like the quintessential jurisprudential
fuddy-duddy, this author wishes that the New Jersey Supreme
Court would have proceeded with more caution. At the very least,
one would have expected a more sustained exploration of the intent
of the enacting legislature rather than an opportunistic seizing upon
the words of the statute when dealing with an insurance product
(WCIEL coverage packages) historically identified with the bodily
injury of smashed toes rather than the newer, more controversial
bodily injury of physical manifestation of emotional trauma due to
sexual harassment. Similarly, one might have hoped for a more so
phisticated analysis of public policy than the abrupt conclusion that,
because the purpose of the workers' compensation statutory
scheme was protection of workers from traditional bodily injury,
latter-day developments in the law. of employment claims must be
subject to this same public policy regime. 128
126. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
127. See id. at 65.
128. One can, of course, make a strong case that statutory meaning evolves over
time and that courts should even embrace the task of "updating" legislation. See e.g.,
WILUAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (outlining
such an approach, defending its legitimacy, and discussing its application). This view is
of course controversial in many quarters. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Newt Ging
rich: Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209 (1995) (book review)
(criticizing the author's approach as too unsettling and creating the potential for parti
san opportunism). I actually support so-called "dynamic" statutory interpretation if it is
not excessive in degree. However, Schmidt v. Smith did not undertake a thorough and
nuanced dynamic statutory analysis. It simply read the statutory language with formal
istic literal breadth.
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Rather than making this leap, the New Jersey Supreme Court
should have recognized that employment discrimination claims,
particularly sexual harassment claims, are in an evolving state, as is
the response of employers and insurers to such claims. As a result,
some patience in allowing private actors to develop a market re
sponse and to permit the state's legislative and executive officials to
determine if, as a matter of policy, the market's response to the
problem is sufficient is in order. By imposing coverage as a matter
of law, notwithstanding the insurer's clear exclusionary language,
the Schmidt court shifted the political landscape in favor of man
dated coverage, and may have truncated the evolution of public
policy in this area altogether. For example, had the Schmidt court
refrained from imposing coverage, other actors in New Jersey gov
ernment, politics, and society would have been required to address
the issue, debating and deciding the question of whether to specifi
cally include discrimination claims within required EL coverage.
The legislature and executive branches may have established a spe
cial regime for discrimination coverage. They still might.
But because of Schmidt v. Smith,129 the status quo has been
changed from one where the insuring agreement controls to one of
mandated coverage. If the new mandated coverage status quo is to
change, those seeking .to change
it will need to overcome the bur
.
dens of inertia. This means overcoming interest groups that have
something to protect in the Schmidt ruling, as well as overcoming
the ordinary inertia of placing workers' compensation statutory re
form on the legislative and regulatory agenda, processing it, educat
ing political actors, persuading them, forcing a vote, and so on.
In effect, Schmidt has made the public policy "playing field"
uneven. Those who think that discrimination risk management
should be dealt with outside of ordinary workers' compensation law
now bear the burden of effecting political change. Because employ
ers and insurers are powerful interest groups, they may well be able
to shoulder the burden, although this is by no means clear. It is, of
course, not at all apparent whether employers and insurers are suf
ficiently united to effect revision of the impact of Schmidt. For ex
ample, employers may regard the decision as one worth protecting,
even at the expense of spending political capital to fend off insur
ance industry attempts to legislatively overrule Schmidt, which one
certainly expects. However, if EL premiums increase substantially,
employers may join insurers in seeking to decouple discrimination
129. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998).
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coverage from EL insurance, unless desired discrimination cover
age becomes more expensive when purchased through a separate
EPL policy,130
The one thing that seems safe to assume is that no one can
even begin to predict the impact of Schmidt. As discussed above,
there is no certainty as to what New Jersey's reaction to the deci
sion will be. The statute may stand unchanged, or it may be modi
fied in reaction to the decision. An overruling by the court itself is
unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, in view of the court's
unanimous decision. To date, despite the interest the decision has
drawn in the insurance trade press and scholarly journals, there ap
pears to be no concerted political activity in response to Schmidt.
Outside of New Jersey, there is no evidence that other courts are on
the brink of either emulating or rejecting Schmidt. There does not
yet appear to be any cases pending in other states that would
prompt other courts to consider the issue, even though most state
workers' compensation laws contain language similar to the New
Jersey statute at issue in Schmidt. 131
Because Schmidt creates something of a tabula rasa on the is
sue of whether bodily injury from discrimination is a mandated cov
erage under state workers' compensation systems, the question
remains: does an arguably incorrect interpretation and decision
nonetheless create a better workers' compensation insurance sys
tem? In the wake of Schmidt, New Jersey EL carriers will presuma
bly rewrite their policies to specifically include discrimination and
harassment claims or will require that employers purchase EPL in
surance as a condition of purchasing workers' compensation and
EL insurance. In any event, one expects insurers to collect a pre
mium for providing this coverage, which now must be provided
under state law if an insurer is to write EL coverage at all. Only by
130. At this juncture, the financial impact of Schmidt v. Smith remains unclear.
According to one regulator, "making predictions of skyrocketing premium rates [is] a
matter of speculation." See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16. In fact, one insurer attorney,
while admitting that he could not predict the number of discrimination claims in the
offing, concluded that the average cost of each such claim was likely to be high, exerting
upward pressure on WClEL insurance rates. However," '[g]iven what the Supreme
Court decided, insurers can't rewrite the exclusion,'" which suggests that any increased
costs will inevitably be passed along to employers. See id. (quoting insurer attorney
Kevin Fitzgerald); see also McGonigle, supra note 2, at 100.
131. However, "[l]awyers who were interviewed felt the decision would not apply
outside New Jersey." Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16. Presumably, counsel meant that the
decision would not have extraterritorial effect on the non-New Jersey operations of
New Jersey-based employers. They may also have meant that the Schmidt decision, for
the reasons discussed in this Article, is unlikely to be emulated in other states.
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refusing to be an EL insurer can the carrier avoid the mandated
discrimination coverage of Schmidt.
In the wake of Schmidt, however, insurers retain considerable
latitude regarding insurance products and coverage. For example,
an EL insurer could closely track the Schmidt court's interpretation
of the statute and'restrict its discrimination insurance to claims
where bodily injury is alleged. In a similar fashion, the EL insurer
could presumably place more stringent reporting requirements or
triggering criteria on its EL policies. Also, more aggressive exclu
sions for discrimination claims could be utilized, but these would
most likely be ineffective in light of the broad mandate for coverage
the court found imposed by statute in Schmidt. EL and related in
surers may thus embrace Schmidt and offer expansive coverage, but
charge for it. In the alternative, EL insurers might attempt to limit
their discrimination coverage to the extent permitted by Schmidt
and subsequent decisions enforcing Schmidt.
This evolving world of WCIELIEPL packages for employers
will presumably be more expensive, but will also be more compre
hensive, unless insurers adopt a very grudging reaction to Schmidt.
Employers will presumably desire to continue to purchase work
place liability insurance as before, but now they will need to pay for
the discrimination coverage. Functionally, this expands the pool of
policyholders in New Jersey holding employment discrimination in
surance. With this larger risk pool, insurers may be able to more
quickly acquire the underwriting and actuarial expertise to offer
broad discrimination claims coverage at more reasonable rates.
If this occurs, Schmidt v. Smith may prove to be a most satis
factory decision despite its analytic flaws and activist bent. The
court may succeed to a degree in "technology forcing" by mandat
ing this type of coverage for employers through the EL policy, just
as pollution standards are viewed by many as helping to force in
dustries to develop better technology for controlling air emissions
and wastewater discharges.
It would be useful for society if discrimination claims were sub
jected to more widespread insurance coverage: employers would
have greater protection; employees would have reduced risk of in
adequate compensation due to employer insolvency or impoverish
ment; and insurers would make money, creating economic growth
(so would lawyers, but that in itself is not a reason to oppose an
otherwise useful development). Presumably, the incidence of dis
crimination and harassment over time will decline, not only because
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of the deterrent value of discrimination litigation (which is present
even without insurance), but also because of the presence of insur
ance underwriting.
Insurers, of course, hope to profit from writing coverage. In
surers that write discrimination coverage may prove adept at
screening risks and counseling policyholders in order to reduce the
incidence of discrimination claims. Applicants turned down for
EPL coverage or the blended WCIELIEPL coverage, which this au
thor expects will emerge in the wake of Schmidt, must respond by
improving personnel policies in order to qualify for coverage. Poli
cyholders will presumably listen to insurer instructions for avoiding
or minimizing claims.
In short, it is possible that Schmidt will prompt substantially
expanded insurance coverage for discrimination claims, giving
workers enhanced protection, and spurring growth in this segment
of the insurance industry. It is also possible that the net impact of
Schmidt will be to increase insurance premiums for employers or to
force some insurers out of the New Jersey market with no signifi
cant expansion in the availability of discrimination coverage.
Rather than hope for the best in the wake of a disruptive decision,
this author suggests that the Schmidt court should have allowed the
evolutionary process of the political system to take place without
the judicial compulsion occasioned by the decision.
CONCLUSION

Close attention to text is a useful trait in the law, whether the
text is a constitution, statute, or contract. Also important is atten
tion to the intent of the contracting parties, the purpose of the in
strument, the expectations of the parties, and the larger sphere of
public policy goals attending legislation and governing private eco~
nomic conduct. When courts embrace either textual or nontextual
interpretative factors to the exclusion of the other, the resulting ju
dicial analysis is suspect and potentially detrimental to both the
legal system and to its participants. Ordinary contract construction
methodology should be displaced by public policy fiat only in clear
cases. Schmidt arguably breached this axiom. Although the even;'
tual impact of Schmidt may well be positive, its methodology
should not be emulated.

